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Should the Illinois Courts Care About Corporate
Deadlock?
Thomas J. Bamonte*
I. INTRODUCTION
The so-called Chicago School of Law and Economics has
contributed many things to the practice and study of corporate law.
For present purposes, its most important contribution may be its
insight that a corporation is a "nexus of contracts."' In other words,
the business enterprise is the product of a large number of
relationships between capital suppliers and managers, employees and
managers, the enterprise and its customers, and the like.2 Much of the
success of an enterprise depends on the quality of these relationships.
At least in the broad sense of the term, corporate deadlock, which
occurs when the relationships between-or among-the principal
shareholders and managers of a corporation break down, is certainly
not an infrequent occurrence. There are as many possible reasons for
deadlock as there are business enterprises. Corporate principals may
find themselves at loggerheads because of personality differences,
different investment horizons and risk preferences, honest policy
differences over the direction of the enterprise, alleged self-dealing by
one or more individuals, struggles over succession issues and the like.
The opportunity for deadlock is enhanced in the relatively small
business, such as the "corporate partnership" between two or perhaps
a few more individuals, where the same people assume multiple
functions: suppliers of capital, including sweat equity; directors;
officers; and shareholders.
* Deputy General Counsel, Chicago Transit Authority; Adjunct Professor, Chicago-
Kent School of Law. Mr. Bamonte was a member of the committee that drafted the 1995
amendments to the Illinois Business Corporation Act discussed in this Article, but the
views he expresses on those amendments are his own. This Article is adapted from Mr.
Bamonte's remarks at the 1997 Family Business Legal & Financial Advisor Conference
at Loyola University School of Law on November 11, 1997.
i. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-
311 (1976); see also infra note 20.
2. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 311.
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It seems obvious that a business enterprise is harmed when the
principals have fundamental disagreements that result in deadlock.
Thus, it seems reasonable to expect the courts to be active in
attempting to promptly resolve these disputes. Yet, the courts take a
decidedly nonchalant approach to the real-life problems of deadlock
and are reluctant to intervene on the sole ground that the principals in a
corporation are deadlocked.' Their behavior begs us to reexamine
whether and to what extent deadlock harms an enterprise in a fashion
that should attract the law's attention, and to determine the competence
of the courts to resolve a deadlock.
Courts are quick to abandon this "hands-off' approach once a
deadlocked party takes aggressive self-help measures designed to
break the deadlock. Thus, the law of deadlock must be considered in
context with the extensive jurisprudence that has arisen regarding the
shareholder remedy for oppression, the expansion of fiduciary duties
in the close corporation context, 5 and statutes that give complaining
shareholders a cause of action to seek dissolution of their corporation
or an alternative remedy such as a buy-out of their shares when those
controlling the enterprise act wrongfully.6 Thus, the law of corporate
deadlock can best be understood as a judicial high wire act. On the
one hand, the courts are reluctant, for good reason, to intervene when
the principals in a business enterprise are deadlocked.7 On the other
hand, their hands-off approach provides an incentive for frustrated
parties to take self-help measures to break the deadlock that may harm
the enterprise more than prompt judicial intervention might have.
This Article discusses why the law of corporate deadlock is so non-
interventionist.' The Article contrasts this hands-off approach to the
more interventionist stance taken by the courts when a corporate
principal takes self-help actions, and focuses on the expanded
shareholder remedies provisions of the Illinois Business Corporation
Act ("BCA").9 Further, the Article argues that there are two instances
in which the courts should use their expanded equitable powers to
intervene in deadlock situations: (1) when the deadlock threatens the
3. See Thomas J. Bamonte, Amendments to the Shareholder Remedies Section of the
Illinois Business Corporation Act, 84 ILL. B.J. 256 (1996); see also infra note 13
(naming the few reported Illinois cases dealing with corporate deadlock).
4. See infra Part III.A.
5. See infra Part III.B.
6. See infra Part III.B.
7. See infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part Il.
9. See infra Part III.
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business enterprise itself with serious harm;'0 and (2) when the
shareholders, in good faith, are unable to resolve their differences and
creative intervention by the court may help to secure a resolution of the
problem."
II. THE COURTS AND THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE DEADLOCK
Illinois law recognizes the seriousness of corporate deadlocks.
Section 12.56 (a)(1) of the BCA authorizes the courts to order the
dissolution of a corporation, or some equitable alternative to
dissolution, when the shareholders or directors are deadlocked and the
corporation faces irreparable harm or the business of the corporation
no longer benefits the shareholders. 2
There is relatively little reported Illinois law on the issue of
corporate deadlock.' 3 Two explanations come to mind. First, the
principals in the ongoing dramas of corporate deadlock may not
consider deadlock itself to be a problem serious enough to justify the
cost of filing suit against a fellow participant in the enterprise.
Second, even if deadlock poses significant real-life problems for the
corporate principals, the courts do not view deadlock as a serious
enough problem to warrant a large expenditure of judicial resources.
10. See infra Part IV.
I1. See infra Part IV.
12. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56 (a)(1) (West 1996).
13. See, e.g., Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131 (Iil. 1960)
(ordering dissolution of a close corporation based on oppressive conduct of its president
when he failed to procure shareholder support for corporate action and shareholders were
otherwise deadlocked); Kaluzny Bros. v. Mahoney Grease Serv., 518 N.E.2d 1269 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988) (upholding dissolution of joint venture although it was profitable when
deadlock caused majority of disputes); Smith v. Shrader Co., Inc., 483 N.E.2d 283 (I11.
App. Ct. 1985) (declining to dissolve corporation because no legitimate shareholder
deadlock was established where shareholders were merely unable to agree regarding terms
of voluntary dissolution or redemption of shares); Mandell v. Centrum Frontier Corp.,
407 N.E.2d 821 (III. App. Ct. 1980) (upholding dissolution of partnership when
partners were deadlocked regarding sale of property); Callier v. Callier, 378 N.E.2d 405
(I1. App. Ct. 1978) (finding evidence of failure to agree on redemption of shares and
terms of voluntary dissolution insufficient to order dissolution based on corporate
deadlock); Ward v. Colcord, 249 N.E.2d 137 (II1. App. Ct. 1969) (holding dissolution
may be appropriate when bylaws require unanimous consent for corporate action but
shareholders do not agree); Regas v. Danigeles, 203 N.E.2d 730 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964)
(comparing land trust to other business enterprises and ordering dissolution of trust due
to management deadlock regarding tenants of trust-owned building); Frerk v. Frerk, 188
N.E.2d 773 (II1. App. Ct. 1963) (affirming appointment of interim receiver for
deadlocked corporation pending dissolution); Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Building Corp.,
184 N.E.2d 792 (Ill. App. Ct. 1962) (refusing to liquidate corporation upon application
of minority shareholders when no evidence of deadlock, oppression, or corporate waste
was present).
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Based on my experience, the first explanation does not suffice.
Corporate principals view disputes with other major participants in the
corporate enterprise as very serious problems, both to themselves and
to the enterprise itself. Deadlock is often viewed as, at best, a
temporary, fragile and unacceptable accommodation that only
postpones the inevitable clash for control of the enterprise. More
often, deadlock is viewed as the result of one party getting the
advantage over other corporate principals. In other words, deadlock
often amounts to an assertion of veto power over the direction of the
enterprise by one party, who attempts to hold up for personal gain
other principal members of the corporate enterprise by asserting this
veto power. The deadlock results when the other principals refuse to
bend to the wishes of the party with the veto power. Needless to say,
enterprises with two fifty percent shareholders are tailor-made for
deadlock situations.
However, as observed by Professor Charles Murdock in his
important article, mere allegations of corporate deadlock "do not get
the judicial blood boiling."' 4 Even though judges are human, and no
doubt enjoy dramatic cases more than run-of-the-mill disputes, a
glance at the docket of most courts shows that a low entertainment
quotient cannot explain why courts do not intervene more aggressively
in corporate deadlock cases. There are several other possible reasons
why courts are reluctant to intervene based solely on allegations of
corporate deadlock. First, courts are not especially well-equipped to
wade through the often tangled web of business and personality issues
that tie up a company in a deadlock. Deadlock cases generate the sort
of quarrelsome "he said, she said" questions that are messy, time-
consuming and difficult for a court to resolve. It also is difficult for
the courts to make the type of business judgments that are often the
basis for a deadlock. Should a business expand or contract? Should
the principals take out their profits or plow earnings back into the
company? What is the best product mix for the company? How
should the company be financed? Should the business be sold or
passed on to the next generation of family members? The common
law and the corporate law statutes provide few, if any, answers to
these type of questions. 5 There may be a real social cost to delegating
14. Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority
Shareholders and Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
425, 453-55 (1990) (discussing corporate deadlock as one of the traditional bases for
judicial dissolution of a corporation, its permissive nature, and the usual requirement of
irreparable harm).
15. See, e.g., Callier, 378 N.E.2d at 408 (explaining that "[tihe term deadlock and
irreparable injury are both undefined and troublesome").
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these types of decisions to the courts. The cold shoulder the courts
currently give the merely deadlocked participants in a business venture
may be a healthy message to corporate principals to go back and work
out their differences because the deadlocked participants know the
most about their personal financial situations, the company, and the
markets in which the company competes.
The second reason why the courts may be reluctant to intervene
when deadlock alone is at issue is because such intervention may
waste judicial resources. Common sense suggests that in the fullness
of time, many disputes, even between business principals who are
bitterly divided, will be resolved. Changes in the fortunes of the
company, the financial situation or health of the company principals,
or a myriad of other factors may be a catalyst for a resolution of the
disputes that produced the deadlock. Likewise, the intervention of
third parties, such as in the form of pressure applied by the company's
lawyer or banker, or by family members or business associates, may
bring the principals to the table and lead to a resolution of their
differences. Thus, courts have good reason to be cautious before
committing scarce judicial resources to resolve corporate deadlock
disputes. Market forces, family considerations, good advice and
subtle pressure from third-party advisors and financiers, and a
renewed appreciation of the value of mutual self-interest may serve
better to resolve a deadlock than a contentious court battle.
The third reason courts appear reluctant to intervene in corporate
deadlock situations goes to the heart of the question of what is a
corporation. As has been well-documented, the prevailing view of
what is the corporation has changed quite dramatically over time.' 6
Over several centuries the private business corporation emerged from
the municipal corporation as a distinct legal entity.' 7 The practice of
chartering corporations for specific public purposes emerged in the
middle of the last century.18 It was only after general incorporation
laws came into vogue that it truly became possible for corporations to
be conceptualized as private entities or associations, and corporate law
was understood as a form of private ordering, rather than as a species
16. See generally David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201,
201-205 (1990) (discussing the history of American corporate law).
17. See Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1078-
1099 (1980) (explaining the problematic dual public and private nature of the city
corporation and the resulting development of the public and private distinction for
corporations).
18. See Millon, supra note 16, at 207 (noting that public functions corporations
included private banks, insurance companies, public utilities, and charitable and
municipal corporations).
1998] 629
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of public law.' 9
The view of the corporation as the product of private ordering has
continued to prevail to this day.20 It is that understanding of the
corporation that no doubt accounts for the reluctance of the courts to
intervene in disputes solely on the grounds of corporate deadlock. If
the courts conceptualize the corporation as the product of private
ordering, then a deadlock among the principals appears to be akin to an
unfortunate spat between private parties, and not something that
warrants judicial attention. Courts that subscribe to the notion that
corporate law is a form of private ordering among private parties are
not inclined to view judicial intervention as necessary in corporate
deadlock situations to protect the "public interest" from the harms
associated with deadlock. Courts, likewise, trust in the market to
supply the deadlocked principals with strong corrective medicine if, in
fact, the deadlock begins to harm the operations of the enterprise.
The final reason that courts are reluctant to intervene in deadlock
situations is because deadlock is not necessarily bad. Just as deadlock
can be the product of selfish and narrow-minded corporate principals
who block advancement of the business, it also can result from
attempts by wise and farsighted corporate principals to save the
company from rash financial or business decisions. Corporate
democracy presumably produces the same sort of "deadlocks" that are
a feature of political democracy itself. These deadlocks can provide a
healthy breathing space for competing demands and issues to be
thrashed out in due course. Judicial intervention in deadlock situations
can produce an unnatural end to a healthy decision making process.
In sum, the judicial reluctance to intervene in corporate deadlock
situations is consistent with the limits of judicial competence, the
privatization of corporations and corporate law, and the fact that
deadlocks are often a perfectly acceptable outcome during the life cycle
of an organization.
III. BEYOND DEADLOCK: JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN DISPUTES
BETWEEN CORPORATE PRINCIPALS
Even though the Illinois courts are reluctant to intervene in pure
corporate deadlock situations, they are not hesitant to intervene when
disputes between corporate participants move beyond the deadlock
19. See id. at 211-216 (discussing the natural entity theory of corporations which
holds that corporations are empowered through their shareholders, not through the
state).
20. See id. at 229-231 (noting the new economic theory emphasis which describes a
corporation as a "nexus of contracts").
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phase.2 In the 1995 amendments to the BCA, the Illinois General
Assembly signaled its intention that courts continue to actively exercise
their equitable powers in intra-corporate dispute situations.
22
However, the judicial decisions concerning the valuation of the
interests of disgruntled minority shareholders serve as a check on these
two developments.
A. The Shareholder Remedies
As Professor Murdock documented, Illinois was one of the first
states to give minority shareholders a remedy against "oppression" at
the hands of those in control of the company.23 The BCA has long
provided that shareholder oppression provides a ground for the
dissolution of the corporation or the imposition of an alternative
remedy, such as the buy-out of the shares owned by the complaining
shareholder.24
As a practical matter, the cause of action for shareholder oppression
is confined to the close corporation setting. Many courts recognize
that close corporations are different from public companies in certain
important respects. 25  First, it is much more common in a close
corporation than in a public company for the large shareholders to also
be involved in the day-to-day operations of the company and derive a
substantial share of their income from salaries and other perquisites.26
21. See Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316 (I11. App. Ct. 1990). See infra notes
49-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hagshenas.
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. See Murdock, supra note 14, at 455 n.199. Illinois first included "oppression" as
a ground for corporate dissolution in 1933. See id. (citing 1933 II1. Laws 308, 351); see
also Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a
Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25 (1986-1987)
(discussing Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960), as one of the
first cases to use oppression as a basis of relief for minority shareholders in a close
corporation).
24. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.55 (West 1996). The predecessor of the current
section 12.55 of the BCA provided that a court "in lieu of... ordering dissolution, may
retain jurisdiction and:
(1) Appoint a provisional director;
(2) Appoint a custodian; or
(3) In an action by a shareholder, order a purchase of the complaining
shareholder's shares ......
Id. at 5/12.55 (a)(l)-(3).
25. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583-584 (II. 1964) (highlighting
the defining characteristics of a close corporation).
26. See, e.g., Battaglia v. Battaglia, 596 N.E.2d 712, 719 (Ill. App. 1992) (stating
that "the conduct of the brothers over the course of 40 years indicates that they
maintained a fiduciary duty to each other similar to that of partners"); see also Illinois
Rockford Corp. v. Kulp, 242 N.E.2d 228, 233 (I11. 1968) (holding that shareholders
63119981
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A common result is that corporate principals do not hold diversified
investments. Instead, most of their capital is tied up in a single
enterprise, and thus, they are inclined to aggressively protect their
perceived economic self-interest, and are particularly vulnerable to
exploitative actions by others in the enterprise. 27
Second, the relationship between the corporate principals in the
small company may be more than merely commercial-family and
friendship ties may also bind corporate principals. 28  However
beneficial these personal and family relationships between the
principals of a close corporations are when setting up and capitalizing
an enterprise, they often add to the ferocity of the dispute when the
principals clash.29 Third, there is no ready public market for the stock
of the close corporation, denying shareholders the exit remedy that is
available to shareholders of public companies. 30
The absence of a ready market for the stock of close corporations
and the heavy dependence of the corporate principals on salaries rather
than dividends as a source of income, provide an opportunity for
exploitative self-dealing by those in control of the corporation. A
classic example of oppressive conduct occurs when those in control of
the corporation freeze out a minority shareholder with a substantial
investment by removing the shareholder from the board, terminating
the shareholder from his or her job and then causing the company not
to pay any dividends. 31 This tactic allows those in control of the
corporation to pay themselves a sizable salary, while depriving the
frozen out shareholder any return on his or her substantial investment
in the enterprise.32
who had been close business and personal associates for a long period of time owed
fiduciary duties to each other). See generally J.A.C. Hetherington, Special
Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close Corporation, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 1
(1969) (discussing the problems encountered by close corporations under conventional
corporation laws).
27. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW, 229-230 (1991). In contrast, shareholders of public companies
typically are far more diversified because their capital investments may bear little or no
relation to their employment.
28. See id. at 228. See generally 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON,
O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 3:06 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1997)
(discussing a squeeze-out technique that involves eliminating minority shareholders
from directorate and excluding them from company employment).
29. See id. § 2:02.
30. See Galler, 203 N.E.2d at 583-84; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note
27, at 230-32.
3 1. See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984).
32. See generally O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 28, § 3:02 (outlining generally a
variety of devices that majority shareholders typically use to benefit themselves at the
632 [Vol. 29
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As might be expected, there is no bright-line test for what types of
shareholder conduct constitute the "oppression" of a shareholder.
Distinguishing "oppression" from mere heavy-handedness by those in
control of the corporation inevitably involves a highly case-specific
weighing of the facts and equities.33 Illinois has a fairly rich
jurisprudence in this area.34 Most states have joined Illinois in
recognizing a cause of action for shareholder oppression. 35 Courts
utilize two main approaches. The first approach is to analogize the
major shareholders in the close corporation to partners in a partnership
and hold major shareholders to a higher fiduciary duty standard.36 The
expense of minority shareholders).
33. Compare Hager-Freeman v. Spircoff, 593 N.E.2d 821, 829-30 (III. App. Ct.
1992) (holding that allegations that controlling shareholder, inter alia, terminated
minority shareholder, froze her out of business, refused to share profits or pay dividends,
falsified entries in corporate books and mismanaged company stated cause of action for
oppression) with Coduti v. Hellwig, 469 N.E.2d 220, 230 (II1. App. Ct. 1984)
("[Plaintiff's] complaints stem from his position as a minority shareholder and from
personal disagreements with [defendant], neither of which form a basis for the drastic
remedy of corporate dissolution."), overruled by Schirmer v. Bear, 672 N.E.2d 1171 (111.
1996).
34. See Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 (II1. 1960);
Cent. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 141 N.E.2d 45, 51 (111. 1957); Hager-Freeman v.
Spircoff, 593 N.E.2d 821, 830 (I11. App. Ct. 1992); Smith-Shrader Co. v. Smith, 483
N.E.2d 283, 291 (111. App. Ct. 1985); Coduti v. Hellwig, 469 N.E.2d 220, 225-27 (I11.
App. Ct. 1984); Jaffe Commercial Fin. Co. v. Harris, 456 N.E.2d 224, 232 (Ill. App. Ct.
1983); Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 839, 844 (II1. App. Ct. 1980); Gray v.
Hall, 295 N.E.2d 506, 509 (11. App. Ct. 1973); Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty
Co., 285 N.E.2d 574, 581 (I11. App. Ct. 1972); Ross v. 311 North Cent. Ave. Bldg.
Corp., 264 N.E.2d 406, 410-13 (111. App. Ct. 1970). Many states now recognize a
shareholder cause of action for shareholder "oppression." See generally F. HODGE
O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, 2 O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS §
8.13-8.21 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1997) (discussing ways to resist squeeze-outs and relief
based on oppression).
35. See generally REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANN. § 14.30 (1984)
(stating that most jurisdictions allow suits to be brought by shareholders to cover
deadlock situations and claims of oppression, illegality, fraud or waste). Most
jurisdictions follow the Model Act pattern of explicitly allowing a shareholder to bring
an action for judicial dissolution on grounds of oppressive shareholder conduct. See id.
Those jurisdictions that do not specifically refer to this ground of dissolution include:
Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, and
Oklahoma.
36. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975);
see also Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486-487 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Guy v. Duff &
Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1090-91 (N.D. I11. 1987); Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557
N.E.2d 316, 321-323 (II!. App. Ct. 1990); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,
353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976); Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167, 169-171 (Miss.
1989). Interestingly, the Illinois Business Corporation Act provides that "[a] holder of
• ..shares of a corporation shall be under no obligation to the corporation ...with
respect to such shares other than the obligation to pay the corporation the full
634 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 29
second approach is to examine the conduct challenged by the
disgruntled shareholder and find liability if that conduct was contrary
to the reasonable expectations of the shareholders when they entered
into the business enterprise.37 These approaches are not mutually
exclusive, rather, they are generally complementary. For example, the
rationale for imposing enhanced fiduciary duties may well be that
when initially establishing the business, the principals reasonably
expect that their conduct vis-a-vis each other will be higher than the
commercial norm.
Delaware is a notable exception to this trend. Following the lead of
some powerful critics of the expansion of fiduciary duties, the
Delaware Supreme Court adamantly refuses to apply different
fiduciary duty standards in the close corporation setting.38 Its rationale
for this rule is to encourage close corporation shareholders to contract
with each other for enhanced legal duties rather than enlisting the
courts to rely upon general equitable notions to develop such rules.39
consideration for which said shares were issued[.]" 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6.40 (West
1996).
37. See generally Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985) (holding that
forced buy-out of a minority shareholder of a closely held corporation was not an abuse
of discretion); Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348 (Me. 1988) (holding that in the
absence of a showing of bad faith or fraud, the business judgment rule prevents a finding
that family members breached duties to each other); Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d
849 (Mass. 1988) (holding that where parties' dispute was purely private and did not fall
within unfair or deceptive trade practice legislation, joint venturer's duty to each other
was not breached); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch Co., 645 P.2d 929 (Mont. 1982) (holding that
dissolution of a family corporation was warranted by finding of oppression based on the
expectations of the shareholders); Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019 (N.J. 1993)
(holding that minority shareholder had to establish nexus between fraudulent and illegal
acts and minority shareholder or her interest in the corporation); In re Kemp & Beatley,
Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that fraudulent and oppressive conduct by
the company's board of directors warranted judicial dissolution); Meiselman v.
Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983) (involving involuntary dissolution of family
corporations); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D. 1987) (holding that the trial
court abused its discretion in ordering dissolution); Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 262 S.E.2d
433 (W. Va. 1980) (finding that mere procedural irregularity in holding of corporate
meetings is not sufficient to constitute a cause of action under "freeze-out" theory). The
"reasonable expectations" approach has not been expressly adopted by the Illinois
courts. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56. See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 subd.
3a (West 1985 & West Supp. 1998) (directing courts to "take into consideration ... the
reasonable expectations of the shareholders"); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-19.1-115(3)
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997) (also directing courts to consider the reasonable
expectations of the shareholders).
38. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380-81 (Del. 1993) ("[It] would
be inappropriate judicial legislation for this [clourt to fashion a special judicially-
created rule for minority investors.").
39. See Blackwell, 626 A.2d at 1380. The court also pointed out that Delaware, like
many states, has a special close corporation statute that allows businesses to
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Delaware's approach makes sense-for Delaware. By holding that its
general corporate law, which is by far the most developed in the
country, applies in the close corporation context, the Delaware courts
have helped enhance the attractiveness of Delaware as a place for
incorporation of non-public companies.40
At the same time, the relatively high cost of incorporating in
Delaware may screen out many enterprises whose principals lack the
sophistication or the resources to negotiate a shareholders agreement or
take other steps to define up front the obligations they owe to one
another.4 1 If the pool of potential Delaware corporations is limited to a
relatively sophisticated group, then it may make sense, from a policy
perspective, to apply a uniform set of rules to all Delaware
corporations. These same considerations do not apply in other states,
where a far greater proportion of the businesses incorporated are
relatively unsophisticated; thus, different legal standards governing
close corporations makes better sense.42
B. The Amended Shareholder Remedies of The Business
Corporation Act
Before the 1995 amendments to the shareholders remedies section
of the BCA, the statute provided that a court could order dissolution of
the corporation or an alternative remedy such as a buy-out of the
disgruntled shareholder's stock if the shareholder could prove that it
incorporate as close corporations. See id. The court reasoned that because the
legislature specifically addressed the problems of the close corporation, it was not the
court's role to step in and add its own set of rules. See id.
40. For opposing views on whether the competition between states to induce
companies to incorporate in a particular state produces a desirable development of the
corporate law, see William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 251 (1977). See
generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992) (addressing the
desirable role of state competition in shaping corporate law); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX.
L. REV. 469 (1987) (analyzing the existing theories of Delaware corporate law and
examining the application of an interest-group theory to Delaware statutes and judicial
decisions).
41. See RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. ScoTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW
AND SECURITIES REGULATION 111 (1980); Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Race for
the Bottom v. Climb to the Top: The AL! Project and Uniformity in Corporate Law, 10 J.
CORP. L. 431 (1985); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate
Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987).
42. For a spirited attack on the notion that Delaware should be the preferred state of
incorporation, see Charles W. Murdock, Why Illinois? A Comparison of Illinois and
Delaware Corporate Jurisprudence, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1 (1994).
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was a victim of oppressive conduct, fraud and the like.43 The
realization that the courts were being overly conservative in applying
these remedies propelled the effort to amend the shareholder remedies
section.
Most notably, in Coduti v. Hellwig,4 the Illinois Appellate Court
held that in order to be entitled to any remedy for oppressive or other
wrongful conduct, a shareholder must first establish that the
misconduct was serious enough to warrant dissolution of the
corporation.45 This ruling made it extremely difficult for shareholders
to secure any remedy when they were victims of oppressive conduct
because dissolution is a "drastic remedy," that, in effect, destroys the
enterprise in order to save the complaining shareholder.4 6 By
requiring shareholders to first prove the appropriateness of dissolution
before being entitled to any remedy, Coduti turned a much less
intrusive remedy, such as a buy-out of the complaining shareholder's
shares, into a "drastic remedy." Indeed, after the General Assembly
adopted the amendments discussed below,47 the Illinois Supreme
Court, interpreting the pre-amendment state of the law, rejected the
Coduti approach and held that shareholders need not prove the
necessity of dissolution -in order to be entitled to a less drastic
alternative remedy. 48 Had that ruling come a few years earlier, there
might well had been no initiative by the corporate bar to press for
changes to the shareholder remedies provisions of the BCA.
Hagshenas v. Gaylord,49 perhaps the most important Illinois
corporate law decision in the last decade, illustrates the problem with
the courts' overly conservative approach to shareholder remedies.
Hagshenas' notoriety stems largely from the court's holding that large
shareholders in close corporations may owe a fiduciary duty to the
company and the other shareholders, even if the shareholder no longer
is an officer or director of the company, no longer plays an active role
in operating the company, and no longer receives a salary from the
company.5 But Hagshenas is also important because it illustrates how
43. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.55 (West 1996).
44. 469 N.E.2d 230 (III. App. 1984), overruled by Schirmer v. Bear, 672 N.E.2d
1171 (Il1. 1996).
45. Coduti, 469 N.E.2d at 231.
46. See Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 141 N.E.2d 45, 51 (111. 1957). But
see Murdock, supra note 14, at 440-447 (arguing that corporation financial markets are
liquid enough to preserve the intrinsic value of businesses that must be dissolved).
47. See infra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
48. See Schirmer v. Bear, 672 N.E.2d 1171, 1171 (I11. 1996).
49. 557 N.E.2d 316 (II1. App. Ct. 1990).
50. See id. at 321. The notion that shareholders in Illinois close corporations have
636 [Vol. 29
1998] Corporate Deadlock 637
the courts' reluctance to intervene in disputes among deadlocked
shareholders of close corporations can encourage these shareholders to
engage in costly and disruptive self-help measures that may have a far
greater adverse impact on the company than a well-crafted judicial
remedy earlier in the process.
Hagshenas involved a successful travel agency business jointly
owned and operated by two husband and wife couples.5' Relations
between the two couples deteriorated and Hagshenas unsuccessfully
tried to sell his shares. 52 Hagshenas then petitioned the circuit court
under the shareholder remedies section of the BCA, arguing that the
shareholders were deadlocked and that dissolution of the company or a
buy-out of his shares was appropriate.5 3 The circuit court denied the
petition; the appellate court, when reviewing the case, did not discuss
enhanced fiduciary duties in some circumstances is well established. See, e.g., Rexford
Rand Corp. v. Ancel, 58 F.3d 1215, 1217 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that " a shareholder in
a close corporation owes a duty of loyalty to the corporation and to the other
shareholders."); Sebastian v. Zuromski, No. 91-C4529, 1993 WL 78713, at *3 (N.D.
I11. Mar. 18, 1993) (holding that a thirty-three percent shareholder who resigned as
officer and director but was unable to sell stock back to the corporation "may have owed
a fiduciary obligation to the corporation and its shareholders" until the final sale of
stock or dissolution of the company); In re Dearborn Process Service, Inc., 149 B.R.
872, 880 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1993) (finding that "shareholders in a closely held
corporation owed a fiduciary duty to deal with the utmost good faith, fairly, honestly,
and openly with their fellow stockholders."); Illinois Rockford Corp. v. Kulp, 242
N.E.2d 228, 233 (II1. 1968) (concluding that "[the] decision to form and operate as a
corporation rather than as a partnership does not change the fact that they were
embarking on a joint enterprise, and their mutual obligations were similar to those of
partners" (quoting Tilley v. Shippee, 147 N.E.2d 347, 352 (Iil. 1958))); Doherty v.
Kahn, 682 N.E.2d 163, 175 (I11. App. Ct. 1997) (concluding that an enterprise in which
four shareholders "are directors and officers and participants in the day-to-day
operations" was "clearly an enterprise closely resembling a partnership"); Giammanco
v. Giammanco, 625 N.E.2d 990, 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (recognizing principle that
"as the sole and coequal shareholders [the parties] . . . owed each other a fiduciary duty
similar to that of partners"); Battaglia v. Battaglia, 596 N.E.2d 712, 719 (Iil. App. Ct.
1992) (holding that three shareholder-director brothers "maintained a fiduciary duty to
each other similar to that of partners"); see also Zokoych v. Spalding, 344 N.E.2d 805,
819 (I11. App. Ct. 1976) (finding that "in a two-man corporation stockholders owe each
other the duty to deal fairly, honestly and openly"). Other Illinois decisions
recognizing the enhanced fiduciary duty standard in the close corporation context
include the following: In re Kids Creek Partners, 212 Bankr. 898, 936 (Bankr. N.D. Il1.
1997); Adverse L.A. Inc. v. Shine, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9448 (N.D. Il. June 11,
1996); Robinson v. The Midlane Club No. 94-C1459, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14790
(N.D. III. Oct. 17, 1994); Ruca Hardware, Ltd. vs. Chien, No. 94-C3635, 1994 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14064 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1994); Cafcas v. Deltaan & Richter, P.C., 699 F.
Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Levy v. Markal Sales Corp., 643 N.E.2d 1206 (III. App. Ct.
1994); Jaffe Commercial Fin. Co. v. Harris, 456 N.E.2d 224 (III. App. Ct. 1983).
5 1. See Hagshenas, 557 N.E.2d at 318.
52. See id. at 324.
53. See id.
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the correctness of the circuit court's rationale for its decision.'
More than a year passed and the relationship between the parties
deteriorated further.55 Frustrated by the circuit court's refusal to
intervene and by the parties' inability to resolve their disputes,
Hagshenas resigned as an officer and director of the company.' He
then set up a competing travel agency and recruited both customers and
employees from his old business, in which he remained a fifty-percent
shareholder. 7 The appellate court held that Hagshenas' actions
violated a fiduciary duty he owed to the company and the other
shareholders based upon his continued presence as a fifty percent
shareholder.- It explicitly based this fiduciary duty Hagshenas owed
as a shareholder on the analogy of a close corporation to a
partnership. 5 9 The power Hagshenas could continue to wield as a
fifty-percent shareholder was important to the court's analysis.60
Some, but not all later decisions, have limited Hagshenas' extension of
fiduciary duties to shareholders to situations where the shareholder has
the power to play a major role in operating the company.6
We can only speculate what might have happened had the circuit
court in Hagshenas been more willing to step in and attempt to craft an
equitable solution to the dispute that drove the principals apart. The
shareholder remedies section of the BCA, as amended, attempts to
give circuit courts the tools to intervene creatively in such disputes.62
The amendments rest on the principle that close corporations
substantially differ from large public companies, and thus create a new
section-section 12.56-that is devoted solely to the remedies available
to the shareholders, officers and directors in non-public Illinois
companies.63
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 318-19.
58. See id. at 323.
59. See id. at 323-324.
60. See id. at 323.
61. See also Reese v. Forsythe Mergers Group, 682 N.E.2d 208, 215 (I11. App. Ct.
1997) (finding Hagshenas is not applicable in public company settings). Compare
Dowell v. Bitner, 652 N.E.2d 1372, 1379 (I11. App. Ct. 1995) (finding that a 23%
shareholder who did not have power to "hinder, influence or control" the corporation did
not owe fiduciary duties), with Rexford Rand Corp., 58 F.3d 1215 (concluding that a
25% shareholder breached fiduciary duty owed to corporation).
62. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56 (West 1996). For a list of alternative remedies
under section 12.56, see infra note 70.
63. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56.
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Perhaps most notably, section 12.56 makes changes to the
"triggers" for the alternative remedies and expands the list of
alternative remedies the courts may employ.64 As with the section
12.55 remedies for the shareholders of public companies, section
12.56 provides a remedy to shareholders of close corporations who
are victims of oppressive, fraudulent or illegal conduct by those in
control of the corporation.65 Section 12.56 provides a remedy when
the directors or shareholders are deadlocked and the enterprise is
crippled as a result.6 6 However, section 12.56 is unique in that it
provides that close corporation shareholders have standing to bring an
action "in his or her capacity as a shareholder, director or officer[.]"67
Section 12.56 adopts this approach because oppressive conduct may
be directed at shareholders in one or more of those capacities and a
remedy should be available regardless of the form of the oppressive
conduct.
Even though it broadens the basis for shareholder standing, section
12.56 still requires complaining shareholders to make a substantial
showing before they are entitled to relief.' If they seek relief from
deadlock alone, shareholders must establish that the company is
threatened with irreparable harm or "the business of the corporation no
longer can be conducted to the general advantage of the
shareholders[.]"69 Establishing oppressive conduct, to say nothing of
fraud or other illegal conduct, is no easy task. No one should make
the mistake of interpreting section 12.56 as giving disgruntled
shareholders an easy opportunity to get the relief they seek from those
in control of the company.
Section 12.56 provides courts with a non-exhaustive listing of
alternative remedies. 70 These remedies range from court-ordered, non-
64. See id. at 5/12.56(a). For the list of alternative remedies under section 12.56, see
infra note 70.
65. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56 (a). Section 12.55 contains analogous
provisions. See id. at 5/12.55 (a).
66. See id. at 5/12.56 (a)(l)-(2).
67. Id. at 5/12.56 (a)(3).
68. See id. at 5/12.56 (a).
69. Id. at 5/12.56 (a)(2).
70. See id. at 5/12.56 (b). The express close corporation remedies that are
alternatives to dissolution are as follows:
(1) The performance, prohibition, alteration, or setting aside of any action of
the corporation or of its shareholders, directors, or officers of or any other
party to the proceedings;
(2) The cancellation or alteration of any provision in the corporation's
articles of incorporation or bylaws;
(3) The removal from office of any director or officer;
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binding mediation to a buy-out of the complaining shareholder's
shares.7§ The statute also provides that dissolution of the company is
the remedy of last resort that a court may order only if all other
alternative remedies prove insufficient. 72 The amendments also make
clear that the circuit court retains all of its equitable powers to shape a
remedy specially suited to the circumstances of the shareholder's
complaint.7 3
When read in conjunction with the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in Schirmer v. Bear,74 which interpreted the predecessor
statute, it seems especially apparent that section 12.56 introduces a
regime that empowers courts to order shareholder remedies that are
proportional to the wrongful conduct established by the complaining
shareholder. With Hagshenas as an object lesson in the costs of
waiting too long to intervene in shareholder disputes, Illinois courts
should consider themselves empowered by section 12.56 to step in
and be creative in helping corporate principals work out-or thrash out-
their disputes. Thus, courts should not be reluctant to refer a case to
mediation, or to enjoin challenged conduct until the propriety of that
conduct is established, or take a host of other appropriate steps when
the complaining shareholder has made some substantial showing of
wrongdoing.
In using these equitable powers, the courts should be acutely
sensitive to the form of the dispute. Some disgruntled principals want
to remain in the enterprise and some are looking for an economically
viable way to exit from the enterprise. A buy-out of the complaining
(4) The appointment of any individual as director or officer;
(5) An accounting with respect to any matter in dispute;
(6) The appointment of a custodian to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation... ;
(7) The appointment of a provisional director.
(8) The submission of the dispute to mediation or other forms of non-binding
alternative dispute resolution...
(9) The payment of dividends;
(10) The award of damages to any aggrieved party;
(11) The purchase by the corporation or one or more shareholders of all, but
not less than all, of the shares of the petitioning shareholder for their fair
value ....
Id. Even before passage of section 12.56, Illinois courts utilized alternative remedies
other than a buy-out of the complaining shareholders stock. See, e.g., Abreu v. Unica
Indust. Sales, Inc., 586 N.E.2d 661 (111. App. Ct. 1991) (discussing the appointment of
provisional director).
71. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56 (b)
72. See id. at 5/12.56 (b)(12).
73. See id. at 5/12.56 (c).
74. 672 N.E.2d 1171 (111. 1996).
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shareholder's shares is the obvious remedy of choice when the
shareholder seeks to exit the enterprise, but the court's task is more
complicated when the plaintiff seeks to remain in the enterprise. In
that case, a court-ordered buy-out would defeat the complaining
shareholder who had proven that those in control of the enterprise
acted wrongly yet wanted to remain part of the revamped corporate
enterprise.
C. The Puzzling Problem of Valuation
A stock buy-out is the most common remedy sought by complaining
shareholders for the simple reason that disgruntled shareholders often
want to exit the company. The BCA provides that shareholders who
are successful in obtaining a buy-out of their stock under section
12.56, or who have perfected dissenters rights under section 11.70, 75
are entitled to receive the "fair value" of their stock.76 Since the state
of Illinois has long recognized a shareholder remedy for oppressive
conduct and now has an expansive alternative remedies statute, one
might expect Illinois courts to define "fair value" in a way that is
favorable to the dissenting or disgruntled shareholder. Likewise, one
would expect Delaware, a state that rejects special treatment of close
corporation shareholders, to have valuation rules that are stacked
against the dissenting shareholders.77
In fact, the opposite is true. The Delaware courts define "fair value"
as meaning that the dissenting shareholders are entitled to their
proportional share of the value of the business enterprise.78 The
Delaware courts reject the application of "minority interest" and "lack
of marketability" discounts when valuing the shares of dissenting
shareholders under the theory that the shareholder being bought out is
entitled to his or her full proportionate share of the value of the
enterprise. 79 The Illinois courts, however, allow the imposition of
such discounts when determining the "fair value" of the stock of
dissenting minority shareholders.'
75. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11.70 (West 1996).
76. See id. at 5/11.70 (c). Section 11.70 (j) of the BCA states that fair value "means
the value of the shares immediately before the consummation of the corporate action to
which the dissenter objects excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation
of the corporate action, unless exclusion would be inequitable." Id. at 11.70 (j)(1).
77. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
78. See Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Hernett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1142 (Del. 1989).
79. See id. at 1143.
80. See, e.g., Weigel Broadcasting Co. v. Smith, 682 N.E.2d 745, 750 (I11. App.
Ct.), appeal denied, 689 N.E.2d 1147 (I1. 1997).
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A clear definition of "fair value" has eluded the Illinois courts thus
far, but an emerging consensus seems to have developed that allows
the courts to impose sizable "minority interest" and "lack of
marketability" discounts when valuing the complaining shareholder's
shares for purposes of a buy-out.8' These discounts are not required
by the BCA. Rather, the courts interpret the BCA as vesting them
with the discretion to impose such discounts and most courts are
willing to impose them when valuing the interest held by the
disgruntled shareholder who is exiting the enterprise.'
The problem with such discounts is that they may result in
undercompensation of a close corporation shareholder, whose return
includes salary and other perquisites, as well as a share of the profits.
Because these discounts can shave fifty-percent or more off the
amount paid to the shareholder from the shareholder's proportionate
share of the value of the enterprise, the continued use of these
discounts by the Illinois courts will be a powerful disincentive for
dissatisfied shareholders who wish to exit the enterprise to invoke the
shareholder remedies section of the BCA. 3
To the extent that the Illinois courts have considered the relationship
between the alternative remedies provisions of section 12.56 and the
valuation provisions of the BCA, the current approach can be
rationalized. Vesting the circuit courts with broad discretion in the
valuation process, including the use of minority and marketability
discounts, gives them the flexibility to craft a financially equitable
remedy. This is consistent with the equitable powers vested in the
courts under section 12.56."' One of the dangers of an open-ended
definition of "fair value," of course, is that in individual cases, courts
will abuse that discretion and undercompensate a shareholder who has
triggered the section 12.56 remedies. The larger concern, however, is
that in the aggregate their low valuations, based on the application of
81. See, e.g., Laserage Tech. Corp. v. Laserage Laboratories; Inc., 972 F.2d 799 (7th
Cir. 1992); Stanton v. Republic Bank of South Chicago, 581 N.E.2d 678, 682 (Ill.
1991); Weigel, 682 N.E.2d at 750; SPSS, Inc. v. Carnahan-Walsh, 641 N.E.2d 984, 990
(I11. App. Ct. 1994); Kalabogias v. Georgou, 627 N.E.2d 51, 57 (Ii. App. Ct. 1993);
Institutional Equip. & Interiors, Inc. v. Hughes, 562 N.E.2d 662 (III. App. Ct. 1990);
Independence Tube Corp. v. Levine, 535 N.E.2d 927, 931 (II1. App. Ct. 1988); Stewart
v. D.J. Stewart & Co., 346 N.E.2d 475, 480 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
82. See, e.g., Weigel, 682 N.E.2d at 750.
83. See generally Thomas J. Bamonte, Measuring Stock Value in Appraisals Under
the Illinois Business Corporation Act, 80 ILL. B.J. 236 (1992) (stating that states which
do not recognize minority and marketability discounts allow for the interest of both
minority and controlling shareholders to be more closely aligned toward maximizing
the value of the company).
84. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56 (C) (West 1996).
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minority interest and marketability discounts, will cause fewer
aggrieved shareholders to utilize the new shareholder remedies
provisions of the BCA than the General Assembly intended.
A legislative definition of "fair value" that clearly includes (or does
not include) minority and marketability discounts would be beneficial,
especially given the impact that these discounts have on the value of
the complaining shareholder's stock and, thus, the value of the section
12.56 remedies themselves. Parties can more easily bargain around a
clear standard in shareholders' agreements and the like as well. What
exists at present, however, is the unresolved tension between the
expansive remedial thrust of section 12.56 and the parsimonious
approach to valuation taken by the courts when they value the shares
held by the complaining shareholder.
IV. DEADLOCK, THE NEW SHAREHOLDER REMEDIES PROVISIONS
OF THE BCA, AND THE DUTIES OF RESPONSIBLE PARTIES
The new shareholder remedies of section 12.56 of the BCA should
have some effect on how the courts respond when presented with a
case of corporate deadlock. As discussed above, courts are reluctant
to intervene in corporate deadlock situations; this reluctance may not be
all bad from a policy perspective. The adoption of section 12.56
expanded the statutory list of approved remedies that are alternatives to
dissolution.' Prior to section 12.56, the primary alternative remedy
was the buy-out of the complaining shareholder's stock, and this
remedy was often held hostage to Coduti's demanding proof standard.
In the context of the close corporation, where a complaining
shareholder may have a very sizeable portion of the stock of the
company and the company's access to capital to fund a stock buy-back
is limited, such an alternative remedy can be almost as disruptive as
dissolution itself.
As a result of the amendments, courts are specifically authorized to
order remedies that are less disruptive to the continued operation of the
company than dissolution or a buy-out of the complaining
shareholder. 87 These remedies include non-binding mediation,
appointment of the complaining shareholder to the board, and other
such remedies that are consistent with the courts' equitable powers.88
85. See supra Part II.
86. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56 (b). See supra note 70 listing the alternative
remedies.
87. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56 (b)(l)-(10).
88. See id.
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It also is important to note that section 12.56 is intended to supply
the courts with the tools to intervene effectively when the complaining
shareholder wishes to remain in the enterprise, which is often the case
in a deadlock situation. Both dissolution and a buy-out of the
complaining shareholder accommodate the disgruntled shareholder
who wishes to exit the company and cash out his or her investment.
However, dissolution and buy-out provide little relief to a shareholder
who wishes to be involved in the enterprise. In contrast, many of the
alternative remedies set out in section 12.56 can be invoked by a
shareholder who wishes to remain part of the enterprise.
Thus, the changes brought by section 12.56 should encourage the
courts to be more willing to intervene in deadlock situations with
remedies designed to facilitate a negotiated resolution of the dispute.
However, the courts should remain as cautious as they have been
historically to invoke the strong remedies of dissolution or a forced
buy-out of the complaining shareholder's shares as a remedy. For
example, had the circuit court in Hagshenas been armed with section
12.56, it might have responded differently and may have avoided the
disruptive self-help initiative by Hagshenas. 9 Consistent with section
12.56, the circuit court might have entered an order barring the parties
from raiding the corporate till to pay for personal items, directing the
other shareholders to provide Hagshenas with accurate information
about the finances of the company, and requiring the parties to mediate
their disputes. Skillful mediators are often successful in resolving the
most difficult of disputes. Courts can increase the chances of
successful mediation by holding out the prospect that they may turn
over control of the company to a custodian or appoint a provisional
director holding the tie-breaker's vote if the parties fail to resolve their
dispute and underscoring the risks inherent in further litigation.
This is not to suggest that the courts should intervene whenever one
principal in an enterprise comes to court and claims that the other
principals are behaving unreasonably and that, as a result, the
principals are deadlocked. Section 12.56 retains the requirement that
before a court will intervene, the complaining shareholder must prove
that the company will be irreparably harmed by the continuation of the
deadlock. 90 The courts can use this requirement to weed out those
deadlocks that are the result of the working of corporate democracy or
that have little impact on the operation of the company.
89. See supra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
90. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56 (a)(l)-(2).
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In those instances where a principal demonstrates that deadlock is
having a major adverse impact on the enterprise, courts should be
creative in applying section 12.56, recognizing that deadlock often
harms employees, suppliers and creditors of the company and,
ultimately, the community at large. Certainly, a court could reasonably
conclude that in view of the benefits conferred upon corporations by
state law, such as limited liability, the major shareholders in
corporations, large and small, should not be allowed to waste
unnecessary time and resources on internecine disputes at the expense
of the continued health of the enterprise. The larger the enterprise and
the larger the number of constituents other than the principals, the
more it makes sense to give some legal recognition to the interests of
those constituents through the legal fiction of the corporation as a
distinct legal entity.
This approach, of course, deviates from the prevailing view of the
corporation as a purely private enterprise and corporate law as a
species of private contract law.9' The legislature is free to revive the
public law dimension of corporate law, at least to a limited extent, to
encourage the courts to give consideration to the interests of the
broader range of corporate constituents than the principal officers and
shareholders when applying section 12.56. The General Assembly's
adoption of the so-called "other constituency" statute, which allows a
board to consider the interests of employees, local communities and
other corporate constituents when making decisions where control of
the corporation is at stake, is just the sort of approach advocated
here. 92
To the extent that the courts in the corporate takeover context
consider the corporation to be an "entity" with its own interests
separate and apart from the personal interests of the principals of the
corporation, advisors of the corporation should also adopt this view in
the event that the controlling parties are deadlocked. The company's
lawyers and accountants can play a creative role in facilitating a
91. See Millon, supra notes 16, 29-31 and accompanying text.
92. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (West 1996). Section 8.85 reads as follows:
In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of directors,
committees of the board, individual directors and individual officers may, in
considering the best long term and short term interests of the corporation,
consider the effects of any action (including without limitation, action which
may involve or relate to a change or potential change in control of the
corporation) upon employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation or
its subsidiaries, communities in which offices or other establishments of the
corporation or its subsidiaries are located, and all other pertinent factors.
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resolution of difficulties between the principals. They can do so by
attempting to bridge the emotional gulf between the two sides. And in
some circumstances, they can do so by asserting the interests of the
company. This can be by small gestures (e.g., insisting that all sides
pay for their copying costs) and large gestures (e.g., appearing in
court as separate counsel for the company).
This sometimes confrontational approach can be difficult because it
may put the company advisor at odds with a corporate principal with
whom the advisor has had long business and social ties. Aggressive
representation of the company during intracorporate disputes,
however, gives the court a reality check on the appropriate remedy to
impose in deadlock situations or other kinds of litigated disputes
between close corporation shareholders. Representatives for the
company, if credibly independent of the disputants, can provide the
court with a valuable source of information about the company and the
nature of the dispute.
The BCA already allows the company to investigate claims made by
a shareholder in a derivative suit.93 Surely, the equitable powers
vested in the courts under the shareholder remedies section of the BCA
likewise vest the courts with the power to order the company's lawyer
and/or other advisors to investigate, in a timely fashion, claims filed by
a disgruntled shareholder and report back to the court. The court can
then use the report to weigh the evidence provided by the disputants
and to frame an appropriate remedy, if any.
By calling upon the company's lawyer and other advisors to play an
independent and active role in disputes under section 12.56, the courts
can accomplish at least two goals. First, the courts can obtain
relatively objective information about the company and the disputants
and hopefully an independent perspective that will be useful in the
court's deliberations. Second, courts can reinforce the notion that the
corporation as a business, and as a legal entity, has interests separate
from those of its principals that are worthy of protection in litigation
under section 12.56.
V. CONCLUSION
Corporate deadlock alone has not engaged the judiciary. Section
12.56 is unlikely to prompt courts to more readily intervene in pure
corporate deadlock situations and impose strong remedies such as
dissolution of a company or an alternative remedy such as a buy-out of
the complaining shareholders' stock. Section 12.56, however, does
93. See id. at 5/7.80(b).
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provide the court with expanded powers to intervene in corporate
deadlock situations using less drastic tools designed to facilitate the
resolution of the dispute. Courts should utilize these powers carefully,
attempting to resolve corporate deadlock situations before they ripen
into full-scale warfare among the principals of the corporation. But at
the same time, they must recognize that corporate deadlocks sometimes
are inevitable and even desirable. In litigation over corporate
deadlock, as with litigation under section 12.56 generally, the courts
should attempt to utilize the advisors to the company to provide the
court with some objective evidence and creative suggestions for
appropriate remedies to settle the dispute between the principals. In
this area especially, it is important for the advisors to the company to
tread carefully and ensure that their allegiance remains with the
company and not merely to one of the principals.
